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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND SOVEREIGNTY
UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF GEOPOLITICS
AMOS N. GUIORA*
1.

INTRODUCTION

The events of the Arab Spring and subsequent developments in
Libya and Egypt raise profound questions regarding the tension
between international humanitarian intervention and state
sovereignty in the context of geo-politics. In examining this
tension, it is necessary to understand overarching geo-political
considerations regarding issues critical to understanding
international relations and international law in a paradigm best
described as “murky.” This murkiness applies to facts on the
ground and the legal and policy questions confronting decision
makers, both regionally and globally. While the Arab Spring was
widely perceived as the dawn of a new age in the Middle East, it is
too early to fully assess its consequences.
On the one hand, elections in Egypt reflect change while
continued massacres in Syria, on the other hand, recall the actions
of previous Middle Eastern regimes. The question regarding Syria
is: when do humanitarian considerations justify intervention into a
sovereign state? The question the international community would
face regarding Egypt is: how should it respond if the Morsi
government reneges on preexisting international obligations?
While some would point to Egypt’s free and fair elections as a
positive indicator, others would suggest that the outcome is
troubling, for it potentially portends significant changes in
Egyptian foreign policy. After all, the electoral successes of the
Muslim Brotherhood suggest that changes are in the offing.
Perhaps Bob Dylan’s oft-quoted phrase that “the times they are
a-changin’”1 aptly captures the moment. But changing where and
to what? Because of the uncertainty of the moment, international
* Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah.
1 BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are a-Changin’, in BOB DYLAN LYRICS 1962–2001
81 (Simon and Schuster ed. 2004).
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decision makers must assess innumerable dilemmas with
insufficient information resulting from significant changes in
Egyptian, Syrian, and other Middle Eastern leadership positions.
After all, one of the practical results—or fall-outs—of dramatic
regime change is the need to identify new, key decision makers
and their inner circles, develop new information and intelligence
sources, and understand the relationship between the new civilian
leadership and the national security establishment.
This is an issue that confronts world leaders daily, requiring
assessment of possible actions by a government that recently
replaced a deeply entrenched regime that ruled with an iron hand
but whose commitment to international obligations was
unquestioned. Both paradigms raise legitimate concerns regarding
the relationship between sovereignty, intervention, and geopolitics. The Syrian dilemma is tangible and immediate, whereas
the Egyptian paradigm is suggestive as a hypothetical. Therefore,
this Essay focuses on humanitarian intervention—or lack thereof—
in the face of extraordinary human rights violations.
That is not to suggest that analyzing possible changes in
Egyptian foreign policy is not important; in the context of postArab Spring ramifications, the “Egypt to where” question is
amongst the most important. One assumes that decision-makers in
the United States, Israel, Europe, and the Middle East are fully
engaged in seeking to better understand the future direction,
policy, and aims of the Morsi government. While that question is
of immense importance, it will not be the focus of this Essay, which
will address the relationship between humanitarian intervention
and sovereignty under the umbrella of geo-politics. To that end,
this Essay will be divided into the following sections: (2) a brief
overview of humanitarian intervention; (3) a short history of
Western intervention in the Middle East; (4) a discussion of
humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty; (5) an
examination of geo-political considerations; and (6) questions for
further study.
2.

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The overriding questions with respect to humanitarian
intervention are (a) for what purpose and (b) to what end. There
also exists the distinction between “absolute” and “limited”
interventions in the context of human rights violations. With
respect to sovereignty, the question is whether significant

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss2/6

07_GUIORA (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/18/2013 11:16 AM

GEOPOLITICS

413

violations of human rights justify violation by external actors of a
nation-state’s sovereignty.
The current Assad regime in Syria has engaged in unrelenting
massacre and torture of thousands of Syrian civilians. Arab and
Western leaders alike have met those actions, which recall the
brutality of Assad’s father, with deafening silence. Whether that
silence reflects a “what do you expect” attitude, studied
indifference, or geo-political considerations given the SyrianIranian relationship, is unclear. What is clear is that, as these lines
are written, the Syrian regime is engaged in ongoing attacks on
Syrian civilians. In the meantime, leaders in the United States,
Europe, and the Middle East respond with clichés devoid of
substance or meaning.
In examining this tension, it is necessary to understand
overarching geo-political considerations. While legal terminology
contributes to framing international humanitarian law issues,
understanding national self-interest and geo-political realities is
essential to their practical implementation. Hence, a study of geopolitics provides the all-encompassing umbrella under which a
myriad of critical and competing issues must fit.
Understanding geo-politics requires analysis of four distinct
factors: self-defense, leadership, humanitarian intervention and
sovereignty, and international cooperation.
Self-defense is
particularly important because it addresses the extent and manner
in which states protect their populations, resources, and interests.
Leadership is germane to the discussion since it highlights the
qualities necessary to resolve complicated paradigms reflecting
distinct disciplines with minimal “margin for error.”
Humanitarian intervention requires reconciling sovereignty with
international obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human
rights.
International cooperation is essential to effective
implementation of geo-politics on the premise that unilateralism is
at odds with the principle of a global community.
Addressing these four factors facilitates understanding the nuts
and bolts of geo-politics. While the four topics may seem
unrelated, I believe that reality suggests otherwise: they are the
core of geo-politics.
This Essay focuses on humanitarian
intervention and sovereignty, but the importance of national
leadership, international cooperation, and self-defense are likewise
critical components.
Focusing on the confluence, if not tension, between
humanitarian intervention and sovereignty highlights the
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dilemmas confronting contemporary decision-makers. Resolving
this tension requires sober analysis of national self-interest while
recognizing limits of external influence on events occurring within
another state. Determining when intervention principles outweigh
sovereignty rights poses significant dilemmas; the complexity is
accentuated when national interests are not consistently and
narrowly defined. Historians will long engage in questioning
whether legitimate American interests were truly at stake when
President George W. Bush ordered U.S. forces into Iraq and
Afghanistan and President Obama ordered their continued
presence in Afghanistan. In the meantime, decision-makers—not
historians and pundits—must resolve this tension while
confronting situations marked by uncertainty rather than certainty.
Contemporary flash-points in the broader Middle East are
numerous: Iran’s nuclear plans; continuing sectarian conflict in
Iraq; the aftermath of the Benghazi, Libya attack; increased tension
between Syria and Turkey; uncertainty regarding possible
intervention in Syria; continuing war in Afghanistan; efforts by AlQaeda to establish a presence in Northern Sinai;2 and Hezbollah’s
demonstrated willingness and capability to do Iran’s bidding.3 The
brazen attack on the American embassy in Cairo4 reflects a
disturbing combination of a significant intelligence failure,
seemingly incompetent Egyptian security forces, and a fumbled
response by the Obama Administration.
3.

THE MIDDLE EAST

History is replete with examples of Western intervention in the
Middle East. Whether through colonization, or military or
humanitarian intervention, Western intervention in the Middle
2 Yaakov Lappin, Israel Preparing for al-Qaeda on its Borders, GATESTONE INST.
(July 16, 2012, 04:00 AM), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3169/israelborders-al-qaeda.
3 Patrick Goodenough, Hezbollah: Iran Will Attack U.S. Bases if Israel Bombs
Iranian Nuclear Facilities, CNSNEWS.COM (Sept. 4, 2012, 3:39 AM),
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/hezbollah-iran-will-attack-us-bases-if-israelbombs-iranian-nuclear-facilities. See also CASEY L. ADDIS & CHRISTOPHER M.
BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41446, HEZBOLLAH: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES
CONGRESS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS
(2011),
available
at
FOR
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41446.pdf.
4 Protests Near U.S. Embassy in Cairo Continue After Obama Warning, CNN
(Sept. 13, 2012, 7:31 PM), available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/13/
world/meast/egypt-us-embassy-protests/index.html.
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East has in many ways defined the relationship between the West
and the Middle East. At one time or another major Western
powers have had a significant presence in the following nations:










Palestine (British Palestine Mandate, 1917–1948)
Lebanon (France, 1920–1946; United States, 1958)
Syria (France, 1920–1946)
Jordan/Transjordan (United Kingdom, 1922–1946)
Libya (France, 1942–1951)
Iran (United Kingdom, 1941–1945)
Iraq (British Mandate of Mesopotamia, 1920–1932;
United States, 2003–present)
Afghanistan (United Kingdom, 1839–1919; Soviet
Union, 1980–1989; United States, 2001–present)
United Arab Emirates (United Kingdom, 1819–1968)

Intervention raises profound questions regarding both the
limits of national sovereignty and the articulation of national selfinterest. What is defined as intervention can also be described as
imperialism (as evidenced in many of the aforementioned cases of
Western intervention in the Middle East). After all, Western
powers have historically perceived Middle Eastern oil and trade
routes as essential to their national interests and have, therefore,
imposed themselves on indigenous populations.
The historical basis for Western imperialism was largely a
combination of: the availability of much needed natural resources,
cheap labor, geo-politics, and Christian missionaries. The result
was both taking (natural resources) and purported giving
(Christianity and democratic values). The intended beneficiary
was the Western power; in large part the indigenous people were
victimized. That said, some have suggested Western powers also
contributed to local cultures by introducing democratic values and
traditions, but the grim tale of post-colonial Africa suggests a
significantly different reality.
One of the clear results of World War II is the dusk that settled
on traditional Western European powers. While the sun (as the
expression went) never set on the British Empire, since World War
II, the United Kingdom has become almost exclusively focused
domestically (including on the Troubles in Northern Ireland) and
France has largely disengaged (following withdrawals from
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Algeria, Vietnam, and Lebanon) from any international
The post-World War II dawn was largely
involvement.5
dominated by the Cold War (until the fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989), as the United States and the Soviet Union (until its fall in
1991) largely “divided” the world into two (with the exception of
non-aligned nations) spheres of influence with extraordinary, but
ultimately restrained, competition for geo-political gains.
From an American perspective, the desire to achieve a
particular regional gain often resulted in American support of
unsavory regimes and leaders for the sole purpose of denying the
Soviet Union a perceived gain. In the Cold War context, “victory”
was piecemeal (if at all), largely limited by the doctrine of nuclear
mutual assured destruction, and mainly devoid of principle other
than perceived gain (however defined) at the expense of the other
side.
The obsession with the other side led both the United States
and the Soviet Union to costly military interventions. Brezhnev’s
decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979 was arguably the beginning
of the end of the Soviet Union, and the Kennedy-Johnson decision
to deploy the U.S. military to Vietnam in the early 1960’s continues
to have a dramatic impact on the U.S. budget, psyche, and armed
forces. In both cases, the United States and the Soviet Union
intervened in a conflict that was “not theirs.” Soldiers were sent to
countries whose language, culture, and conflict were foreign to
them; the mission (other than to stay alive) was unarticulated
beyond vague and confused rhetoric.
In November, 2005, I was invited to speak at the U.S. Military
Academy; it was, without doubt, an extraordinary honor to speak
with West Point cadets on a wide array of issues relevant to the
laws of war and morality in armed conflict. In the context of my
talk, I addressed the issue of “combat mission” and in particular
the mission of the United States in Iraq; the topic was, obviously,
relevant given that many of cadets, upon their commission would
be posted in Iraq. I was, both in my talk and in subsequent
conversations with cadets, struck by a profound lack of clarity and
palpable vagueness in their articulation of the mission that awaited
5 Whether France’s recent intervention in Mali signals a change in this trend
remains to be seen. See Scott Sayare & Alan Cowell, As Mali Fighting Persists,
France Vows to Exit in Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/02/07/world/africa/france-mali-militants.html?_r=0.
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them. Conversations with friends and colleagues who served in
Vietnam suggest a disturbing similarity in this vein between the
two conflicts.
Doubtlessly, a similar talk to Soviet cadets in 1980 would have
resulted in the same ambiguity regarding their mission in
Afghanistan; that conflict, ultimately, demonstrated the Red Army
was little more than a brutal paper tiger.
4.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND SOVEREIGNTY

Military intervention can occur for humanitarian purposes.
NATO intervention (albeit after much tragedy and atrocity) in the
former Yugoslavia is a clear example, as is U.S. intervention in
Haiti in 1992. The philosophy behind humanitarian intervention is
simple: it stems from the principle that “intervention for human
protection purposes . . . is supportable when major harm to
civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the state in
question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the
perpetrator.”6 In other words, humanitarian intervention is based
on the belief that “when a government turns savagely upon its
own people” it becomes the responsibility of “[a]ny state capable of
stopping the slaughter . . . to try to do so.”7
The brutally repressive regime of President Assad (the elder)
was made clear where more than ten thousand citizens were
massacred when Assad ordered the Syrian army to squash a
purported revolt against the regime in the Syrian town of Hama in
1982.8 While the brutal nature of the regime (in addition to the
Hama massacre) was well known and documented, successive U.S.
Presidents turned a “blind eye” in the name of larger interests and
goals. In the context of this pragmatic policy, President Assad
brutalized his people while negotiating with the United States.
Simply put, Syrian domestic affairs were an internal matter that the
United States chose to ignore while focusing on broader geopolitical considerations.
6 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT 16 (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%
20Report.pdf.
7 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 101, 108 (4th ed. 2006).
8 John Kifner, Syrian Troops Are Said to Battle Rebels Encircled in Central City,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1982, at A1.
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The U.S. “blind eye” policy regarding foreign governments’
domestic policy—regardless of its repressive nature and inevitable
human cost—reflects respect for the principle of national
sovereignty. However, as documented above, the United States
has repeatedly violated that principle when broader American
interests are perceived to be at stake.9 This brings us to the
question: Why did the Obama Administration choose not to
intervene in Syria in the spring and summer of 2011? How does
the Obama Administration distinguish between Syria and Libya?
Why did the extraordinary violation of human rights in the latter
justify international intervention, whereas the massacre of innocent
civilians in the former did not? With respect to Syria, the Obama
Administration has limited its response largely to rhetoric.
Secretary of State Clinton commented: “Syria’s future is up to the
Syrian people . . . but of course the efforts by the opposition to
come together to organize in order to articulate a political agenda
is an important part of political reform.”10
In both Libya11 and Syria12 brutal regimes were deliberately
torturing, imprisoning and killing their own citizens. In both
cases, thousands of citizens were forced to flee their homes
recognizing that the regime would brook no dissent and give open
fire orders that enabled indiscriminate shooting by armed forces
into crowds of individuals. In other words, both regimes were
engaged in massacring their citizens. The power of social media
contributed to enormous public scrutiny of both regimes.13

9 NIKKIE R. KEDDIE, MODERN IRAN: ROOTS AND RESULTS OF REVOLUTION 235
(2003) (“Carter followed no clear policy. . . . American military intervention was
not a serious possibility given the united strength of Iran’s revolutionary
movement.”); see also ROBERT A. PASTOR, EXITING THE WHIRLPOOL: U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (2d enlarged ed. 2001).
10 Sebnem Arsu, Clinton Chides Turkey on Rights Record, N.Y. TIMES, July 16,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/world/middleeast/17turkey.html.
11 David D. Kirkpatrick & C. J. Chivers, Photos Found in Libya Show Abuses
Under Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/
world/africa/06libya.html?pagewanted=all.
12 See Syria ‘State-Sanctioned Torture is Crime Against Humanity,’ BBC NEWS
MIDDLE E., (July 3, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middleeast-18684443 (summarizing a Human Rights Watch report that documents the
arbitrary arrests, torture, and enforced disappearances in Syria’s underground
prisons since March 2011).
13 See William Halal, The Arab Spring and the Technology Revolution, WORLD
FUTURE SOC’Y, (May 27, 2011), http://www.wfs.org/content/arab-spring-and-
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In Libya, opponents of the regime took to the streets. Though
uncertainty existed regarding the identity and nature of their
organization, the Obama Administration14 and NATO15 decided to
intervene militarily on their behalf. In a five-month period (AprilAugust, 2011), the United States flew 5,316 sorties, including 1,210
airstrike missions and 101 Predator drone strike missions.16 In
addition, the United States was providing nearly 70% of the
intelligence capabilities and refueling assets,17 and by July 31, 2011,
had spent over $896 million since intervention began.18 The stated
purpose of the military engagement was to force Gadhafi to either
step down or leave Libya; that mission was accomplished.
However, there is an important dichotomy: an organized rebel
group receives significant international military assistance while a
largely unorganized opposition barely receives meaningless
platitudes that accompany non-intervention in the face of
extraordinary violations of human rights. Declarations that the
technology-revolution (recognizing the major role information technology,
namely social media, played in accelerating the Arab Spring).
14 President Obama deployed U.S. military forces to Libya without receiving
congressional authorization under the 1973 War Powers Resolution. See Charlie
Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya
Operation, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/
us/politics/16powers.html?pagewanted=all (remarking that “‘U.S. operations do
not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor
do they involve U.S. ground troops,’” rendering War Powers authorization
unnecessary in the eyes of the Administration). See also Paul Starobin, Op-Ed., A
Moral Flip-Flop? Defining a ‘War’, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/opinion/sunday/harold-kohs-flip-flopon-the-libya-question.html?pagewanted=all (illustrating the issue of framing the
Libyan intervention through a critical examination of Department of State Legal
Adviser Harold Koh’s position on the applicability of the War Powers
Resolution).
15 See Paula Newton, NATO: Libya Mission Will Be to Protect, Not Arm, CNN,
(Mar. 28, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-28/world/libya.nato_1_natocivilians-libya-mission?_s=PM:WORLD (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (indicating that
NATO’s control of the Libyan operation increased during its early stages).
16 See Devin Dwyer, US Military Intervention in Libya Cost At Least $896
Million, posted in Political Punch, ABC NEWS, (Aug. 22, 2011, 6: 43 PM),
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2011/08/us-military-intervention-inlibya-cost-at-least-896-million-.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2012) (tallying total cost
as of Aug. 22, 2011).
17 See generally Mark Benjamin, The White House Hopes You Don’t Google the
War Powers Resolution, TIME U.S. (June 16, 2011), http://nation.time.com/
2011/06/16/white-house-please-dont-goolge-the-war-powers-resolution/
(providing a detailed overview of American operations in Libya).
18 See Dwyer, supra note 16.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013

07_GUIORA (DO NOT DELETE)

420

4/18/2013 11:16 AM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 34:2

Syrian regime has lost legitimacy are true, but they are just that—
declarations. Devoid of intervention, such declarations are akin to
whistling in the wind. The essence of the Obama Administration’s
policy with respect to Syria is mere words, which, needless to say,
is a far cry from its aggressive intervention policy with respect to
Libya.
Herein lies the rub: a compelling argument can be made that
unorganized Syrians are in greater need of international
intervention than were organized Libyan rebels. The United States
and NATO have deliberately turned their backs on the citizens of
one country while readily coming to the assistance of the citizens
of another country. With this in mind, we turn our focus to
humanitarian intervention.
As Professor Ryan Goodman asked, “Should international law
permit states to intervene militarily to stop a genocide or
comparable atrocity without Security Council authorization?”19
According to Article 39, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, “The
Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security.”20
While the U.N. authorized the use of military force against
Libya,21 it has not done so regarding Syria.22,23,24 Does that mean

19 Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J.
INT’L L. 107, 107 (2006).
20 U.N. Charter art. 39.
21 See Jay Solomon, Adam Entous & Joe Lauria, U.N. Clears Way for Attack on
Libya, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703818204576206373350344478.html (noting that the U.N.
Security Council authorized military force against Libyan leader Col. Gadhafi’s
security forces).
22 See U.N. Security Council Issues Statement Condemning Violence in Syria,
CNNWORLD (Aug. 3, 2011, 6:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/
meast/08/03/syria.unrest/index.html?hpt=hp_t1.
23 See UN Security Council Issues Statement Condemning Houla Massacre, RT
(May 28, 2012, 7:34 AM), http://rt.com/news/un-security-syria-houla-348/.
24 See UN Chief, Security Council Urge Restraint Amid Rising Tensions Along
Syrian-Turkish Border, UN NEWS CENTRE (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.un.org/
apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43214#.UH82u650huI (“The members of the
Council demanded that such violations of international law stop immediately and
are not repeated. The members of the Security Council called on the Syrian
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the United States cannot intervene in Syria? As Professor
Goodman and others have written,25 international humanitarian
intervention raises legitimate questions regarding the pretext to
“wage wars for ulterior motives.”26 From the perspective of
international law, a discussion regarding international
humanitarian intervention requires carefully analyzing the
relationship
between
national
sovereignty,
international
responsibility, and grave violations of human rights. The pretext
argument suggested by Professor Goodman is of justifiable
concern when examining specific examples of intervention; in the
two examples discussed in this essay, the application of
international humanitarian intervention principles reflects the
inconsistency previously referenced.
Humanitarian intervention is an inherently complicated
proposition, because it clearly implies both that nation state “A” is
engaged in significant violations of the human rights of its own
citizens, requiring nation state “B” and/or the international
community to recognize that intervention is essential.27 However,
analysis of when intervention is deemed essential, and criteria
justifying intervention suggest both lack of clarity and lack of
objective standards and benchmarks.
The lack of clear criteria as to when intervention is justified, if
not required, suggests that the question is one of interpretation,

Government to fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its
neighbors. . . .”).
25 See Goodman, supra note 19 (arguing that, even though legitimate concerns
to the contrary exist, legalizing unilateral humanitarian intervention can
discourage wars with ulterior motives); see, e.g., Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory
Turn in International Law, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 321, 322 (2011) (purporting that there
has been an unnoticed change in international regulatory law allowing for states
who treat their citizens improperly to come under international scrutiny); Jonah
Eaton, An Emerging Norm? Determining the Meaning and Legal Status of the
Responsibility to Protect, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 765, 784-94 (2011) (discussing
humanitarian intervention); Nicolas Lamp, Conceptions of War and Paradigms of
Compliance: The ‘New War’ Challenge to International Humanitarian Law, 16 J.
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 225, 225 (2011).
26 Goodman, supra note 19.
27 See Learn about the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, INT’L
COALITION
FOR
THE
RESPONSIBILITY
TO
PROTECT,
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-coalition (last visited
Jan. 23, 2013) (detailing an effort to impose a normative standard for demanding
preventative intervention).
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subject to specific circumstances and particular interests.28 In that
vein, then, the question is: why does the United States not
determine that the actions of the Syrian government justify
international humanitarian intervention? As of July 2012, the
Syrian death toll was estimated to exceed 17,000 people.29 At the
time of writing, estimates of deaths in the conflict vary, with
figures ranging from 28,00030 to 33,000.31 In addition to the rising
death toll, up to 28,000 people have been reported missing or in
military or militia custody since the protests began.32 The United
28 Compare Chris Borgen, The “Libya and Humanitarian Intervention” Meme,
OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 24, 2011, 7:07 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/02/24/thelibya-and-humanitarian-intervention-meme (compiling internet commentary on
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s referencing humanitarian intervention in Libya), and Asli
Ü. Bâli & Ziad Abu-Rish, On International Intervention and the Dire Situation in
Libya, JADALIYYA (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/
725/on-international-intervention-and-the-dire-situation-in-libya
(comparing
Libya with Tunisia and Egypt and cautioning against intervention), with Issandr
El Amrani, A Different Take On Foreign Intervention in Libya, ARABIST (Feb. 24, 2011,
09:02 AM), http://www.arabist.net/blog/2011/2/24/a-different-take-on-foreignintervention-in-libya.html (opposing foreign military intervention), and Shadi
Hamid, It’s Time to Intervene, SLATE (Feb. 23, 2011, 1:30 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2286184 (giving the international community options
for supporting a regime change in Libya).
29 See Syria Crisis: Death Toll Tops 17,000, Says Opposition Group, HUFFPOST
WORLD (July 9, 2012, 8:51 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/09/
syria-crisis-death-toll-17000_n_1658708.html.
30 See ‘Massacre’ Alleged as Syria Slams Outside ‘Interference’, CNN (Oct. 2, 2012,
1:52 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/01/world/meast/syria-civil-war/
?hpt=hp_t1 (referencing casualty figures stated by the Local Coordination
Committees of Syria).
31 See Syria Conflict Death Toll at Least 33,000NGO, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
(Oct. 13, 2012, 6:46 PM), http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/288388/syria-conflictdeath-toll-at-least-33000-ngo (“Violence in Syria has killed at least 33,082 people,
most of them civilians . . . .”); Syria Death Toll Nearly 30,000, ALBAWABA (Sept. 20,
2012, 3:38 PM), http://www.albawaba.com/news/syria-death-toll-nearly-30000443029 (citing Syrian Observatory of Human Rights figures); Erika Solomon,
Syrian Death Toll Now Tops 30,000: Activist Group, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2012, 11:15
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/26/us-syria-crisis-tollidUSBRE88P12Y20120926 (citing a British-based Syrian monitoring group).
[Editor’s Note: by February, 2013, casualty estimates stood between 70,000 and
90,000. Cf. Ashley Fantz, Syria Death Toll Probably at 70,000, U.N. Human Rights
Official Says, CNN (Feb. 13, 2013, 2:07 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/
2013/02/12/world/meast/syria-death-toll ; John Kerry: Syria Death Toll Could Be
90,000, Saudis Say, HUFFPOST WORLD (Feb. 14, 2013, 4:53 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/14/john-kerry-syria-death-toll90000_n_2687712.html.]
32 See Syria Crisis: 28,000 Disappeared, Say Rights Groups, BBC NEWS MIDDLE E.
(Oct. 18, 2012, 6:29 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
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Nations reported that 10,000 persons were arbitrarily detained
between mid-March and late June 2011,33 and as many as 40,000 to
80,000 people are being held in detention today.34
In fact, a high-level U.N. human rights team reported finding
systematic human rights violations by the Syrian government,
including summary executions, prisoner torture, and child
targeting during the government’s crackdown on opposition
protestors.35 Based on its findings, the U.N. team recommended
that Syria be referred to the International Criminal Court for
prosecution of the alleged atrocities.36 By comparison, the Libyan
death toll was estimated at more than 1000 on February 23, 2011,37
only weeks before the U.N. authorized intervention in Libya and
NATO began flying sorties over the country.
Precisely because international law does not articulate either
normative or architectural standards as to when international
humanitarian intervention is justified, national leaders arguably
have a responsibility to act.38 For a variety of reasons, the
19986806 (describing reports by various Syrian human rights groups that say
disappearances are rampant and part of a deliberate strategy to terrorize people).
33 See U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Preliminary Report of the High
Commissioner on the Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 7,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/CRP.1 (Jun. 14, 2011) (reporting that some women and
children were among the detained, but human rights defenders, political activists,
and journalists were targeted).
34 See Syrian Activists Call for Release of Detainees, BBC NEWS MIDDLE E. (Jan.
20, 2012, 11:22 AM), www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16646806
(reporting on Syrian activists’ protests against the detention of thousands of
people).
35 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for
Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶¶
69–91, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/53 (Sept. 15, 2011). See also Frank Jordans, U.N.
Syria Mission Finds Systematic Human Rights Violations, HUFFPOST WORLD (Aug.
18, 2011, 7:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/18/un-syriahuman-rights_n_930577.html (summarizing the findings and recommendations of
the U.N. mission).
36 U. N. Human Rights Council, supra note 35, ¶ 94(c).
37 See Rachel Donadio, Italy Says Death Toll in Libya Is Likely Over 1,000, N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
23,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/world/
europe/24italy.html (noting that although the exact number of deaths in Libya is
difficult to estimate, reports that over 1000 civilians have been killed appear
accurate).
38 See Irwin Cotler & Jared Genser, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/opinion/01ihtedcotler01.html?_r=2 (“At the U.N. World Summit in 2005, more than 150 heads
of state and government unanimously adopted a declaration on the responsibility
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international community has determined—whether actively or
passively—that the massacre of the Syrian population by the Assad
government does not justify international humanitarian
intervention. While the human rights violations occurring on a
daily basis do not compare to the horrors of Rwanda,39 Kosovo,40
or Sierra Leone,41 they are not less compelling than the events
transpiring in Libya.42
to protect authorizing international collective action ‘to protect [a state’s]
population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity’ if that state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, or worse, as in
the case of Libya, if that state is the author of such criminality.”); Jayshree Bajoria,
Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 24, 2011),
http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-responsibility-protect/p24480 (stating that if a
state fails to protect its citizens from genocide or other war crimes, it becomes the
international community’s responsibility to do so); Crisis in Syria, INT’L COALITION
FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/
index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria (last visited Nov. 17, 2012) (discussing alleged
human rights violations by the Syrian government and calling for intervention by
the international community).
39 See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2011: RWANDA 34 (2011),
available
at,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186443.pdf
(recalling that between 750,000 and 1 million Rwandans were slaughtered during
the 1994 genocide).
40 The death toll in Kosovo was estimated between 5,000 and 12,000. See Q &
A: Counting Kosovo’s Dead, BBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 1999, 15:36 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/517168.stm. For a more recent report, see
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2009: KOSOVO, available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136039.htm (highlighting the
lingering human rights impact from the 1999 conflict).
41 See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2009: SIERRA LEONE, available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135975.htm (examining Sierra
Leone’s failure to respect human rights in areas such as torture and detention
center conditions).
42 See, e.g., UN Envoy Warns Over Syria, IAFRICA.COM (Oct. 17, 2012, 5:52 PM),
http://news.iafrica.com/worldnews/822235.html (describing the global impact
of the Syrian conflict, negotiations for a truce and ceasefire, and possible
international intervention); Raghida Dergham, Only Turkey’s Intervention Can
Cause a Shift in the Syrian Crisis, HUFFPOST WORLD (Oct. 12, 2012, 12:16 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/raghida-dergham/only-turkeysintervention_b_1961595.html (discussing the various stances of major states
regarding intervention in Syria); UN Chief Warns of Escalating Syria Conflict
Dangers, VOICE OF AM. (Oct. 8, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://blogs.voanews.com/
breaking-news/2012/10/08/un-chief-warns-of-escalating-syria-conflict-dangers3/ (describing Turkey’s retaliatory action against Syria and the latest conflict
information).
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GEO-POLITICS

Geopolitics imposes on national leaders the recognition that
their decisions are not made in a vacuum. Quite the opposite, for
the financial and security interdependence between nation-states
represents the reality of the global community. To that end,
viewing the four issues below as the four legs of geo-politics
significantly facilitates understanding the relationship between the
nation-state and the global community.
Effective geo-politics requires a confluence between the
theoretical and the practical. The former demands that national
leaders understand a wide range of issues including international
law, international relations, finance, geography, and the limits of
military power. This requires the implementation of these distinct
disciplines with sensitivity both to domestic politics and the global
community while recognizing the importance of tactical and
strategic issues alike. Though, prima facie, tactical and strategic
considerations suggest a dissonance, effective national leaders are
able to incorporate both in the decision-making process.
Tactical thinking reflects national security decision-making
focused solely on the immediate security impact, whereas strategic
thinking reflects keen understanding of and appreciation for the
long term, devoid of immediate results and impact. Perhaps
circumstances justify, or dictate, a narrow national security
perspective; while that may be the case, effective leadership
demands the ability to weigh and broadly consider the
ramifications of particular decision points. A leader who cannot
consider issues beyond the immediate is incapable of engaging in
effective geo-politics. A leader whose focus is exclusively tactical
is incapable of identifying future national security threats and
risks.
A global community implies enhanced cooperation across a
wide range of issues including finance, security, border control,
environment, health care, and natural resources. National leaders,
understandably, primarily emphasize domestic considerations.
Nevertheless, effective geo-politics suggest national interests are
significantly enhanced when international affairs are factored into
domestic decision-making. That is, rather than focusing primarily
on its own particular and specific needs, geo-politics implies
recognition that global markets and global security enhance
domestic economy and domestic security alike.
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While international law places great emphasis on sovereignty,
geo-politics and recognition of world order implies limits on
actions individual nation-states may take. This limit, whether selfimposed or externally imposed, seeks to avert conflict with
unpredictable ramifications. In addition, respect for the principle
of sovereignty is minimized in the context of humanitarian
intervention. After all, the very act of intervention, regardless of its
basis, implies violating the sovereignty of a nation-state.
Decisions to intervene in the domestic affairs of a nation-state
imply violation of national sovereignty.
Conversely, not
intervening in the face of human rights violations reflects
unwillingness to interfere in domestic matters of a sovereign
nation though consequences of the decision are clear. The
dilemma whether, when, and how to engage in humanitarian
intervention is directly related to geo-politics: in many ways it
highlights the tension in balancing sovereignty with humanitarianpredicated intervention. This tension, much like determining how
to most effectively respond to the Iranian threat, is at the heart of
contemporary geo-politics.
The decision whether to intervene requires discerning the
proper role of the international community regarding domestic
issues of a sovereign state. With the exception of refugees seeking
safe haven in a bordering country, domestic human rights
violations do not have impact beyond the borders of the state
engaged in rights violations. That is in direct contrast to the threat
potentially posed to the international community by a nuclear Iran.
Nevertheless, both paradigms reflect cutting edge issues relevant
to contemporary geo-politics.
6.

LOOKING FORWARD

The question, then, is: What is the responsibility of the
international community to civilians massacred by their own
government? It goes without saying that some killed by the Assad
regime are engaged in armed conflict with Syrian forces. Of that,
there is no doubt. However, the massacre of women and children,
many of whom were tortured, must be distinguished from the
killing of those firing on Syrian soldiers.43 The consistent refusal,

43 See Frida Ghitis, Why the Syrian Regime is Killing Babies, CNNOPINION
(August 16, 2012, 2:20 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/31/opinion/ghitis-
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best described as brazen, unrelenting, and deliberate, to
distinguish between innocent civilians and legitimate targets is a
clear violation of international law. Nevertheless, the international
community has chosen to ignore the months-long campaign
conducted by the Assad regime. This is not the first time the world
has turned its back on innocent civilians killed by their own
regime; nor, tragically, will it be the last.44 It is equally predictable
that the international community’s hackneyed clichés regarding
the Syrian civil war will be re-articulated in the next humanitarian
crisis. In both cases, the present Syrian conflict and in future
conflicts, the international community will fail in its responsibility
to protect innocent people. Re-articulated, the international
community will limit itself to phrases devoid of substance and
significance; at best, the oft-repeated clichés resemble a bad rerun
providing neither relief nor hope for an all-too vulnerable civilian
population.
In many ways, it is a pattern that repeats itself time after time,
just as the cliché responses sound like a bad rerun. While
discussions are held and platitudes uttered (if not muttered), the
killing continues unabated.
The important key, from our
perspective, is why. “It is not our fight as we don’t have a dog in
the fight” or “we can’t be everywhere” or “why doesn’t someone
else step in” are understandable responses as they resonate with a
public focused on the current economic crisis.45 It is not by chance
that Syria has barely registered on the radar screen in the recent
U.S. Presidential election; after all, the two candidates largely
ignored Afghanistan, where American military personnel are
directly in harm’s way. In addition, Syria is a resource-poor
syria-killing-children/index.html (reporting that forces loyal to President Bashar
al-Assad killed at least 108 people, including women and children).
44 See Jeb Sharp, Intervention in Libya, Why Not Darfur?, PUB. RADIO INT’L
(April 6, 2011, 2:25 AM), http://www.pri.org/stories/world/africa/interventionin-libya-why-not-darfur.html (noting that the United Nations deployed
peacekeeping forces in Darfur, but perhaps only when it was too late).
45 See Doug Bandow, No to Intervention in Syria, AM. SPECTATOR (June 8, 2012,
6:09 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/2012/06/08/no-to-intervention-in-syria
(arguing that “the U.S. needs peace, not more wars”); Gary C. Gambill,
Intervention Won’t Save Syria, NAT’L INTEREST (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/humanitarian-intervention-wont-savesyria-7501 (“Absent a workable plan for saving lives or a compelling strategic
rationale for intervention, the United States should stay out of the conflict” and
use other measures to limit the potential for atrocity).
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country (meaning, no oil) with no clearly articulated or understood
importance from the perspective of U.S. interests.46 In other words,
why should we give a damn?
Those who dismiss the national interest argument are not at
fault; in large part, the Obama Administration has failed to make a
compelling case either for or against intervention, and the media
have, largely, failed to force the Administration to articulate its
rationale for non-intervention.47 While the massacre of more than
21,00048 Syrian civilians raises legitimate questions regarding
humanitarian intervention and the limits of sovereignty, there are,
naturally, additional considerations essential to this conversation.
Those additional considerations, in conjunction with humanitarian
intervention principles, provide much food for thought with
respect to future dilemmas and paradigms.
Re-articulated: regimes that massacre their civilians will
continue to haunt mankind; history very clearly shows this.49 The
question is whether humanitarian obligations, however defined
and implemented, dictate government policy or whether geopolitical considerations and calculations rule the day. In many
ways, the answer is in the question. Were nation-states guided
46 See Chris Mansur, Why NATO Cannot Deal with Syria, in the Same Way as
Libya, OILPRICE (July 2, 2012, 8:44 PM), http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/MiddleEast/Why-NATO-Cannot-Deal-with-Syria-in-the-Same-Way-as-Libya.html
(explaining that because Syria does not have a large oil industry, foreign countries
do not have any long-term oil interests in that country).
47 For an important insight into the larger nature of the conflict in Syria, see
David E. Sanger, Rebel Arms Flow Is Said to Benefit Jihadists in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/world/middleeast/jihadistsreceiving-most-arms-sent-to-syrian-rebels.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=
edit_th_20121015 (describing international involvement in the Syrian conflict,
such as arms shipments, access to intelligence, and U.S. concerns should the
conflict lead to a regime change); Sebnem Arsu & Michael Schwirtz, As Tension
Escalates, Turkey Issues a Ban on All Syrian Aircraft, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/world/middleeast/turkey-bans-allsyrian-aircraft-as-tension-over-war-escalates.html?nl=todaysheadlines&
emc=edit_th (describing Turkey’s response to Syrian aircraft and other military
incursions onto Turkish soil and the latest incidents in the Syrian conflict).
48 See Syrian Death Toll Now Tops 30,000, supra note 31.
49 See generally, ROBERT PASTOR, EXISTING THE WHIRLPOOL: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (2ND .ED, 2001); Peter S. Michaels,
Lawless Intervention: United States Foreign Policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua, 7 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 223 (1987) (describing a history of government massacres of
civilians in Latin America).
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solely by humanitarian principles, then massacres committed by
nation-states against their own civilian populations would have
been mitigated, even at the risk of violating sovereignty. However,
nation-states are—as history repeatedly teaches us—guided by an
additional set of principles best described as self-interest and geopolitics.
To the point: a powerful combination of factors—the
extraordinary volatility of the Middle East, the uncertainty with
respect to Iran’s nuclear development, the heightened tensions
between Syria and Turkey, and the ‘Egypt to where’ uncertainty—
suggest that the massacre in Syria takes a backseat to larger, more
combustible considerations. While those four uncertainties rightly
weigh on the minds of decision-makers, the practical result of
disregarding the massacre in Syria—meaningless platitudes
notwithstanding—is that thousands of people will be killed in the
days and months ahead. While not, evidently, of geo-political
significance, it raises profoundly important questions regarding
the practical essence of humanitarian intervention and whether
age-old historical patterns will inevitably repeat themselves.
It has been suggested to me that intervention in Syria is a
logistical and operational nightmare because of uncertainty
regarding the nature of the forces in conflict with the Assad
regime. Perhaps. But, perhaps not. The sense is that operational
difficulty is an all-too-comfortable rationalization for an
uncomfortable reality: cold geo-political realities trump
humanitarian considerations. Articulation of this standard would
reflect maturity on the part of national leaders who are clearly not
guided either by the spirit or letter of humanitarian intervention.
The decision not to intervene is not predicated by concerns
regarding sovereignty; rather, as the title to this Essay suggests,
humanitarian intervention and sovereignty are under the umbrella
of geo-politics. That is the essence of contemporary diplomacy and
international relations. While not distinct from innumerable
historical examples, perhaps the time has come for national leaders
to stand up and proclaim that geo-politics trumps the principles of
intervention in international law.
A final thought: the tipping point towards intervention and
military action may come, rather ironically, as a result of increased
tension, activity, and violence along the border between Syria and
Turkey. The U.N. and Arab League have warned that this isolated
violence can easily turn into a larger regional conflagration. If
Turkey is attacked outright, or otherwise under assault, the U.N.
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would arguably be forced to defend a member nation; this action
would be defined as defense of a fellow member nation rather than
an act of humanitarian intervention.50

50

See supra note 42.
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